Property rights can also be divided into natural and civil rights. All the rights that a person has received from nature have been modified and newly acquired from civil law, it is more correct to divide them into political and civil rights, taking into their subject. The rights conferred on a person by the state, government, or constitution are called public rights. Examples: right to vote, right to use public parks, etc. Other approaches can be classified in different ways, but there is a significant gap between those who believe that rights are designated as practical reasons by their great weight and those who believe that rights are nothing special in this regard, but rather must be analyzed in duties, permits, powers, etc. or a combination of these. perhaps with the addition of other conditions. Instead, most authors argued that rights should be analyzed in other, more fundamental terms, primarily duty, permission, and power, perhaps with the addition of other criteria. This means that not all rights will be of great importance. Their importance depends on the strength of the reasons of duty, permission, or power. Before examining these reports more closely, it is worth mentioning another point.
Theorists are divided between those who believe that rights are, so to speak, the “reflex” of duty, permission, or power, and those who believe that the law takes precedence over them. The question is whether duty, etc. establishes the right or whether the law establishes duty. Most older authors (e.g. Bentham, Austin, Hohfeld, Kelsen) seem to have adhered to the first view, while more recent authors (e.g. MacCormick, Raz, Wellman) adopt the second view. The second view implies that the force of a right is not necessarily exhausted by an existing set of duties, etc., that flow from it, but may be a reason for the creation of new obligations as circumstances change. The latter view, at least, seems to be more consistent with the operation of constitutional legal claims. This is a different question from whether the criminal law can act to recognize and protect moral rights.
It seems possible to claim this, since moral rights can be protected not only by legal rights, but also by legal obligations towards others (without corresponding legal rights). For example, a legal system could create a criminal offence of harassment to protect a moral right to privacy without necessarily recognizing a legal right to privacy, that is, something that would serve as a positive reason for privacy protection in interpreting unclear rules or in developing laws. As discussion of the relative merits of choice and utility theories has continued and increasingly sophisticated versions of the two have been proposed (see, for example, the tripartite debate in Kramer, Simmonds and Steiner 1998, Kramer 2010, Vrousalis 2010, Van Duffel 2012), some authors have attempted to propose different or combined approaches. Wenar (2005) defends what he calls a theory of “multiple functions”. Accordingly, any “Hohfeld incident” (or a combination thereof) that grants an exception, discretion or authorization, or that authorizes the owner to protect, provide or perform, is a right. However, Kramer and Steiner (2007) argue that this is really nothing more than another version of utility theory and is not superior to existing versions. Another suggestion comes from Sreenivasan (2005), which should apply only to claimed rights and not to other types of rights. The essence of this is that Y is entitled to claim that X performs an action if, and only if, Y`s level of control over X`s duty (intends) corresponds to the level of control that furthers Y`s interests as a whole. Kramer and Steiner (2007) also criticize this situation on the grounds that it would include the case where someone deliberately did not obtain such power on the basis of their own interests.
However, this would lead to a very implausible widening of the circle of those who should be considered right holders. Non-hereditary rights die with the death of their owner. Example: Not all personality rights are hereditary. However, there is no legal right to a testamentary bequest. Legatees under the will can only claim as mere owners, not legally. Their rights are all just and can only be enforced in the manner or according to the just rules provided by law. [Folwell Estate, 68 N.J. Eq. 728, 732 (N.J. 1905)].
Among those who believe that rights can be analyzed, at least in part, in duties, permits, and powers, there is another major division. Some believe that the essence of a right is to have choice or control over the corresponding duty, etc. Others think that the main thing is that one`s own interests are protected by duty, etc. Hart and Wellman are among the proponents of the first point of view, Bentham, Austin, MacCormick and Raz are among those who advocate a version of the second point of view. Legal rights are clearly rights that exist under legal systems or decisions of competent authorities in those jurisdictions. They raise a number of different philosophical questions. (1) whether statutory rights are conceptually related to other types of rights, primarily moral rights; 2) What is the analysis of the concept of legal law? (3) What types of businesses may be legitimate right holders; (4) whether there are types of rights that are exclusive to, or at least much more important in, legal systems as opposed to morality; (5) What rights should legal systems create or recognize? Question (5) is primarily a matter of moral and political philosophy and does not generally differ in principle from the question of what duties, permissions, powers, etc. should create or recognize legal systems. It is therefore not dealt with here. On the other hand, it is quite possible to talk coherently about ownership in a way that does not necessarily correspond to the legal situation. For example, a parent may tell a young child that a certain toy belongs to them, even if it legally belongs to the parent. Similarly, it may be plausible to argue that the concepts of property and possession, even if less solidly protected, may exist in societies that have nothing that we normally recognize as a legal system in its own right.
Some may take such examples as an indication that the notion of ownership is not essentially legal, while others tend to think that they are merely metaphorical extensions of a concept that is legally based. The question here is whether there are fundamental aspects of rights that are exclusive, or at least more important in legal systems, as opposed to morality. First, should rights be analyzed only in terms of duties to others (with another condition), or should we also include other concepts such as permission, power, and immunity? Hohfeld believed that, strictly speaking, something was a legal claim only if it was consistent with an obligation to others, but he argued that the use of the law was often confusing because the reference really referred to one of the other terms. Thus, the law also sometimes said that X had a right if (1) he had A`s permission, (2) he had A`s legal authority, (3) Y had no legal authority to influence him. In most modern legal systems, certain fundamental rights are conferred by the Constitution. This usually gives them some precedence over competing legal considerations, but it can vary from system to system. Sometimes constitutional rights take absolute precedence over any other consideration that is not itself based on a constitutional right. Sometimes they will prefer a single legal result and not another without dictating it. All claims or debts with maturities fall into the category of imperfect rights. One previous point is worth mentioning.
Do all legal systems have a legal concept? Their use is ubiquitous in modern legal systems. We are talking about legislators who have the right to legislate, judges who decide cases, individuals who make wills and contracts; as well as constitutions that grant citizens legal rights against their fellow citizens and against the State itself. However, it has been suggested that even some earlier systems developed, such as Roman law, lacked terminology that clearly separated rights from duties (see Maine (1861), 269-70). The question is primarily of concern to legal historians and will not be pursued further here, but it should be noted that when describing these systems, it may still be legitimate to speak of rights in the modern sense, since, for example, Roman law has clearly achieved many of the same results as contemporary systems. Presumably, he did so using some of the most fundamental concepts in which rights can arguably be analyzed. Constitutions also differ according to the extent to which human rights recognized by international law or international treaties are recognized in domestic law. In some European countries, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights and related decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are transposed into national law and take precedence over any national law incompatible with them.