On the other hand, statements made during settlement negotiations on other disputed claims are not admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings if they are proposed to prove the liability, nullity or amount of those claims. When private parties enter into compromise negotiations, they cannot protect themselves against the subsequent use of statements in private criminal cases. The impossibility of ensuring protection against further use could lead the parties to refuse to be at fault, even if it would allow them to settle the private matter favourably. Such a cooling of settlement negotiations would be contrary to Section 408 policy. The wording of Rule 408 was amended as part of the general revision of the Rules of Evidence to make them easier to understand and to make the style and terminology consistent across the Rules. These changes are only stylistically planned. There is no intention to change the outcome of a decision on the admissibility of evidence. For other provisions of similar importance, see Uniform Rules 52 and 53; California Code of Evidence, § 1152, 1154; Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, §§60–452, 60–453; New Jersey Rules 52 and 53 on Evidence. For these reasons, the committee deleted the House of Representatives amendment and brought the rule back to the version presented by the Supreme Court with an additional amendment. This amendment adds a sentence to ensure that evidence such as documents does not become inadmissible simply because it is presented in compromise negotiations when the evidence can be found elsewhere. A party should not be able to immunize itself against eligibility documents that would otherwise be likely to be discovered simply by offering them as part of a compromise negotiation. Tennessee courts exclude settlements and settlement offers only in civil proceedings and allow them in criminal proceedings. Carter v.
Staat, 161 Tenn. 698, 34 S.W.2d 208 (1931). The proposed rule excludes such evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. Prove (1) the willingness or offer to provide or (2) the acceptance or offer of valuable consideration in the event of any compromise or attempted compromise of any claim, whether in connection with this dispute or any related dispute the claim of which has been or would reasonably be challenged as to its validity or amount; is not admissible to prove the liability or invalidity of a civil action or its amount or of a criminal complaint or penalty. Conduct or statements arising from compromise negotiations are also not permitted. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence actually obtained in discovery simply because it is presented in the context of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion if the evidence is presented for other purposes, such as: proving bias or prejudice on the part of a witness, proving an allegation of undue delay, or proving an attempt to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution; However, a party may not be accused by a prior contradictory declaration in the context of compromise negotiations. There was general agreement that proof of an offer to compromise should not be obtained as evidence as an admission of the validity or nullity of the claim.
As with the evidence of subsequent remedies dealt with in section 407 of the Regulations, the exclusion may be invoked on two grounds. (1) The evidence is irrelevant because the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than an admission of the weakness of the position. The validity of this element varies, as the amount of the offer varies according to the amount of the claim and may also be influenced by other circumstances. (2) An increasingly impressive reason is the promotion of public policies that promote compromise and dispute resolution. McCormick §§76, 251. Although the rule is generally formulated with respect to compromise offers, it is clear that a similar attitude must be taken with regard to compromises made when they are proposed against a party. Of course, the latter situation does not normally arise, unless one of the parties to the present dispute has reached a compromise with a third party. Three states, which had published rules of evidence based on the rules proposed by the Supreme Court, opted for versions of section 408 identical to the Supreme Court`s draft with respect to the inadmissibility of conduct or statements in compromise negotiations. [Nev. Rev.
Stats. §48.105; N. Mex. Stats. Anno. (1973 Supp.) §20–4–408; West statistics. Anno. (1973 Supp.) §904.08]. The amendment is without prejudice to the case law that Article 408 does not apply where proof of compromise is provided to prove notification.
See, for example, United States v. Austin, 54 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 1995) (no error in admitting evidence of defendant`s agreement with FTC, since it was proposed to prove that defendant knew that subsequent similar conduct was unlawful); Zauber v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987) (in a civil rights lawsuit alleging excessive use of force by an officer, an earlier settlement in another city`s brutality lawsuit was duly authorized to prove that the city became aware of aggressive behavior by police officers). Changes after publication and comments. In response to public comments, the proposed amendment was amended so that statements and conduct during settlement negotiations in subsequent criminal proceedings would only be admissible if they are made during settlement talks on a claim submitted by a government regulator. Stylistic changes have been made in accordance with the proposals of the Standing Committee`s Style Sub-Committee. The Committee`s note has been amended to reflect the amendment to the text and to clarify that fraudulent statements made during settlement negotiations are not protected by the article. However, under current law, in most jurisdictions, factual allegations made during settlement negotiations are exempt from this prohibition and permitted. The admissibility of factual allegations made at a settlement hearing is beyond the admissibility only if the declarant or his representative expressly states that the statement is hypothetical or is made without prejudice. Section 408, as referred to by the Court, repealed the traditional rule.
It introduced findings of fact into the prohibition and rendered them inadmissible, as well as an offer for settlement. The last sentence of the rule serves to highlight certain limitations of its applicability. Since the rule excludes only if the purpose is to prove the validity or invalidity of the claim or its amount, an offer for another purpose is not covered by the rule. The illustrative situations generally mentioned are substantiated by the authorities. For proof of bias or bias of a witness, see Annot., 161 A.L.R. 395, contra, Fenberg v.